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 Considering the Offender: Addressing the Procedural Stages of 
Computer Crime in an Organisational Context 
 
IS security represents a growing concern for organisations.  Although hackers and viruses are 
often the basis of such concerns, the inside threat of employee computer crime should not be 
underestimated.  From an academic perspective, there are a modest but growing number of 
texts which examine the ‘insider’ problem.  While attention has been given to the influence on 
offender actions through deterrent safeguards, there has been a lack of insight into the 
interactive relationship between offender choices made during the actual perpetration of 
computer crimes, and the context in which such crimes take place.  Knowledge of this 
relationship would be of obvious interest to practitioners who would aim to manipulate the 
environment and influence offender choices accordingly.  To address this oversight, this 
paper, therefore, advances two criminological theories which it is argued can be used to 
examine the stages an offender must go through in order for a crime to be committed i.e. the 
‘procedural stages’ of computer crime.  Hence, this paper illustrates how the two theories, 
entitled the rational choice perspective and situational crime prevention, can be applied to the 
IS domain, thereby offering a theoretical basis on which to analyse offender 
choices/behaviour during perpetration.  Through such an analysis greater insights may be 
offered into selecting appropriate safeguards to prevent computer crime. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
While hackers and viruses fuel the security concerns of organisations, the threat of employee 
computer crime should not be overlooked.  This message is echoed by numerous security 
surveys which point to the magnitude of the ‘insider’ problem (CSI/FBI, 2004; DTI/PWC, 
2004; E&Y, 2004).  The 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (CSI/FBI, 
2004) revealed approximately 50% of security breaches occurred within the organisation.  
From another perspective, respondents to the UK DTI/PWC (2004) survey were asked about 
the source of their worst security incident.  Of those representing small size (1-49 employees) 
organisations, 32% stated the source was internal.  However, this figure rose to 46% and 48% 
respectively for medium (50-249 employees) and large (250 + employees) companies.    
 
Against this backdrop, a growing number of researchers have turned their attention to the 
security problems posed by employee computer crime (Straub, 1990; Harrington; 1996; Kesar 
and Rogerson, 1998).  However, to date there has been a lack of insight into the interactive 
relationship between offender choices made during the perpetration of computer crime, and 
the context in which such choices take place.  An understanding of this relationship would be 
of obvious interest to practitioners who would attempt to manipulate the environment, and 
influence offender choices to prevent a criminal act.   
 
To address this oversight, this paper focuses on the procedural stages of computer crime i.e. 
the stages an offender must go through in order for a crime to be committed.  Two 
criminological theories, entitled the Rational Choice Perspective (Clarke and Cornish, 2000) 
and Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 1997), are advanced to support analysis of these 
stages.  Rather than focussing on ‘why’ and ‘how’ people become criminals, these 
criminological theories attempt to provide explanations of how offenders interact within the 
criminal context.  Hence, this paper aims to illustrate how the two approaches may offer a 
theoretical basis on which to analyse the procedural stages of computer crime.  It is argued 
that the theories may complement existing security strategies by helping to identify offender 
behaviour in all of the procedural stages, and the associated criminal choices which underpin 
such behaviour.  By so doing, greater insights may be afforded into selecting appropriate 
safeguards to prevent continuation and successful perpetration of the criminal act.    
 
The proceeding section of the paper reviews the existing IS security literature related to the 
area of employee computer crime.  This is followed by an examination of those texts which 
have addressed computer crime from a criminological perspective.  The latter acts as an 
introduction to a description of the two bodies of theory advanced in this paper, namely the 
Rational Choice Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention.  The penultimate section 
discusses how these approaches can be applied to address the procedural stages of computer 
crime, followed by a summary of the main arguments and suggestions for future research, 
which form the conclusion. 
 
Before examining the relevant literature, it is worth just clarifying the relationship between IS 
security and computer crime.  According to Straub and Welke (1998) IS Security 
countermeasure strategies consist of four separate, but related, activities which include i) 
deterrence, ii) prevention, iii) detection and iv) recovery.  These four areas are designed to 
reduce ‘systems risk’ i.e. a ‘systems risk’ exists when an IS is insufficiently protected.  
Hence, the four strategy areas aim to enhance security and protect against threats which 
include employee computer crime.  As noted, the initial aim of an IS security countermeasure 
strategy would be to deter such activity.  If deterrence proved ineffective, the second part of 
the strategy would aim at preventing the offender from perpetrating computer crime, and so 
on.  Therefore, consideration should be given to all four areas of the IS security 
countermeasures strategy to actively reduce ‘systems risk’.  
 
Employees and computer crime 
Within the broad body of work termed IS security, there are a number of texts related to the 
area of employee computer crime.  This section of the paper, therefore, reviews this literature, 
which can be seen to fall into four areas and covers safeguards, the psychology of offenders, 
attributes for offending and the criminal environment.   
 
Safeguards 
Several writers have discussed the broad forms of controls which can be used as a safeguard 
against computer crime by employees (Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Backhouse and Dhillon, 
1995; Kesar and Rogerson, 1998; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Dhillon et al, 2004).  Dhillon 
and Moores (2001), for example, while advocating traditional technical safeguards to enforce 
access to computer systems and their programmes, further note the need for formal and 
informal controls.  Formal safeguards include written policies for clarifying the appropriate 
security responsibilities and roles of staff.  These are complemented by informal controls, 
such as education and awareness campaigns which directly aim to influence the security 
behaviour of employees. 
 
Several researchers consider the behaviour of employees with regard to the deterrent value of 
safeguards (Campbell, 1988; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Straub, 1990; Straub and Nance, 1990; 
Cardinali, 1995; Sherizen, 1995; Harrington, 1996; Straub and Welke, 1998).  Of this group, a 
number have applied General Deterrence Theory to the IS domain (Hoffer and Straub, 1989; 
Straub, 1990; Straub and Nance, 1990; Cardinali, 1995; Harrington, 1996; Straub and Welke, 
1998).  This criminological theory posits that: 
 
Individuals with an instrumental intent to commit antisocial acts can be dissuaded by the 
administration of strong disincentives and sanctions relevant to these acts.   
(Straub and Welke, 1998, p. 445) 
 
Hence, deterrent safeguards advanced by writers in the field include detection activities, 
public reprimands for staff violating procedures, the bringing of civil and criminal suits 
against rogue employees, termination of contracts, security awareness programmes and codes 
of ethics (Campbell, 1988; Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Straub and Nance, 1990; Cardinali, 1995, 
Harrington, 1996, Straub and Welke, 1998).   
 
The Psychology of Potential Offenders 
While there are those writers who consider safeguards to deter offenders, others focus more 
specifically on the offender by examining the psychology of these individuals (Sherizen, 
1995; Harrington, 1995, 1996; Shaw et al, 1998).  Based on interviews with offenders, Shaw 
et al (1998) identified several psychological characteristics.  When collectively present in an 
employee, they argue that these characteristics increase the likelihood of the individual 
perpetrating some form of computer crime.  ‘Computer dependency’, for example, represents 
a situation where individuals exhibit addictive behaviour towards their computer and/or the 
Internet.  Experiencing a history of ostracism and social failure, these individuals turn to 
computers as a substitute for interpersonal relationships.   
 
The psychology associated with the criminal act itself, and the manner in which offenders 
rationalise their actions has also been a focus for security researchers (Sherizen, 1995; 
Harrington, 1996).  As part of her study into the influence of codes of ethics on employee 
computer abuse judgements, Harrington (1996) examines the ability of staff to deny 
responsibility (RD) for their actions.  Those low in RD are able to accept responsibility for 
their behaviour and follow organisational and legal dictates while those high in RD are prone 
to ignoring such dictates by shifting responsibility to others.  This ability to deny 
responsibility is also linked to criminal acts and is used by individuals to rationalise their 
actions in a manner which negates culpability.   
 
Attributes for Offending 
Other writers have considered the offender in terms of a series of attributes they require for 
perpetration (Tugular and Spafford, 1997; Parker, 1976, 1981, 1998; Wood, 2002).  Parker 
(1976, 1981, 1998) argues practitioners need to consider all forms of potential 
‘cybercriminals’ in terms of their skills, knowledge, resources, authority and motives 
(SKRAM), and as a consequence, the implications for an organisation’s security.  An 
alternative perspective is provided by Wood (2002) who solely focuses on the insider.  While 
similarly urging consideration of skills, knowledge and motives, Wood departs from Parker 
by advocating examination of the offender’s risks, processes and tactics.   
 
The criminal environment 
Closely related to the attributes for offending is the context in which criminal behaviour takes 
place (Becker, 1981; Sherizen, 1995).  In an early paper on the subject, Becker (1982) argues 
for a focus on the environment, rather than an individual’s personality, for predicting and 
preventing computer crime.  Becker asserts dishonest employees perceive the organisational 
context in a number of ways and provides a classification of seven ‘criminogenic 
environments’.  So, for example, ‘the land of opportunity’ represents a context in which 
dishonest employees exploit security loopholes spotted during the course of their daily work 
activities.    
 
An alternative perspective is offered by Sherizen (1995) who discusses the ‘criminogenic 
environment’ with reference to how an organisation’s existing structure, values and culture 
may help to reinforce a criminal context.  As Sherizen states: 
 
Do employees perceive that access control measures are put in place?  Do they feel that 
security measures are operating?  Do they assume that their bosses have little interest in 
security?  Are crime often found in the organization, indicating organizational 
vulnerability?  If these factors are found, the organization may have a climate that supports 
or in other ways fosters computer crime.  If this is true, then security personnel need to 
actively change organisational structures and employee perceptions. 
(Sherizen, 1995, pp. 180-181) 
 
As noted, writers in the IS security field have considered employee computer crime by 
focusing on safeguards to prevent such behaviour, the psychology of offenders, attributes for 
offending and the environment in which it takes place.  However, there has been little focus 
on the actual behaviour of offenders, and the decisions which underpin such behaviour, during 
the perpetration of computer crimes.  To add some context to this argument, it is worth 
recalling the work of Straub and Welke (1998) who argue IS security countermeasure 
strategies consist of four activities which include i) deterrence, ii) prevention, iii) detection 
and iv) recovery.  As noted, several researchers focus on deterrence and apply general 
deterrence theory to examine which safeguards achieve this desired form of behaviour.  
Hence, such research addresses how controls deter criminal behaviour through influencing the 
criminal choices of potential offenders.   
 However, what of the second stage of safeguard strategies i.e. prevention?  There is currently 
a lack of insight into the interactive relationship between offender choices made during the 
perpetration of computer crime, and the context in which such choices are made.  Gaining 
greater knowledge of this relationship would be of obvious interest to practitioners who could 
potentially use this knowledge to manipulate the environment and influence offender choices, 
in order to prevent a criminal act.  Advances in this area would complement deterrence efforts 
and bolster security strategies as a whole.  To address this deficiency, two criminological 
theories are advocated in this paper.  Hence, the following section of the text briefly discusses 
those criminological texts which have addressed computer crime.  This acts as an introduction 
to a description of the theories entitled the Rational Choice Perspective and Situational Crime 
Prevention.  It is argued these two schools of thought enable insight into the offender/context 
relationship through an examination of the different procedural stages an offender must go 
through in the perpetration of a crime.  By so doing, these theories may possibly enhance 
prevention strategies through more informed safeguard selection. 
 
 
Criminology and Computer Crime  
Computer crime is a relatively new area of exploration for criminology, accounting for a 
small but growing number of texts.  Common to the vast majority is a preoccupation with 
crimes which take place via the Internet. The forms of crime examined are diverse in nature, 
and include telecommunication fraud (Graboksy and Smith, 1998), pornography (Chatterjee, 
2001), cyber-stalking (Ellison, 2001), hacking (Duff and Gardiner, 1996) and online securities 
fraud (Grabosky, Smith and Dempsey, 2001), to name but a few.   
 
Other criminological research has attempted to profile the personal characteristics of 
computer criminals (Hollinger, 1993; Skinner and Fream, 1997). Using a self-report survey 
and a sample of graduate students enrolled at a US university, Hollinger (1993), for example, 
examined the characteristics of those who committed software piracy or accessed the accounts 
of other end-users on an unauthorised basis.   
 
Related to the aforementioned criminological writings are those texts which fall under the 
heading of ‘white-collar’ crime (for reviews of the white-collar literature see Braithwaite, 
1985; Coleman, 1987; Nelken, 2002).  Topics studied under this umbrella term are diverse 
and numerous including for example, bribery, price fixing, insider trading, toxic dumping, 
long-firm fraud, the manufacturing of unsafe pharmaceuticals, and the like (Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1993; Nelken, 2002).  While very few of the white-collar texts have a sole focus on 
employee computer abuse (Hildreth, 1997), there is a degree of overlap with the IS security 
field in that issues of prevention and deterrence are examined (Braithwaite and Makkai, 
(1991); Schnatterly, 2003; Patternoster and Simpson, 1993; Felson; 2002).  These studies can 
be seen as a response to critics who argue researchers in the white-collar field have focussed 
on ‘who’ commits such crimes and ‘why’, to the neglect of addressing the equally if not more 
important issue of ‘how’ (Levi, 1984; Braithwaite, 1985; Nelken; 2002).  Indeed, of those 
writers who discuss the issue of prevention and deterrence, a number have turned their 
attention to the specific behaviour of employees during the commission process (Paternoster 
and Simpson, 1993, 1996; Felson, 2002).  Paternoster and Simpson (1993), for example, 
advance a rational choice model of corporate crime.   
 
The consideration by white-collar researchers as to ‘how’ crime is committed reflects changes 
in criminology as a whole.  Clarke (1997) argues one ‘mistake’ made by modern criminology 
is that the task of explaining crime has been assumed to be the same as explaining the 
criminal (Gottfredsen and Hirschi, 1990).  ‘Dispositional’ criminological theories have been 
eager to provide accounts of why and how individuals through the  assimilation of specific 
social or psychological influences, or the inheritance of traits, are as a consequence more 
inclined to acts of a delinquent or criminal nature.  However, this is not the same as 
explaining the occurrence of crime, which, aside from requiring a motivated offender, also 
warrants an opportunity.  Simply to explain criminal dispositions, Clarke contends, is only 
half the equation.  What is further required are explanations of how offenders interact with the 
setting in which crime may or may not take place (Ekblom, 1994).  Through developing such 
explanations, insights are afforded into the offender/context relationship, which can be used to 
inform prevention programmes.  Hence, what has emerged over the last four decades are a 
number of approaches entitled Routine Activity Theory (Felson, 2002), Environmental 
Criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991), Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 
1997), and the Rational Choice Perspective (Clarke and Cornish, 2000), which focus on the 
relationship between an offender and the environment in which crimes occurs.  Of these 
approaches the Rational Choice Perspective and Situational Crime Prevention will now be 
described, followed by a discussion of how they may be applied to address the procedural 
stages of computer crime. 
 
 
Rational Choice Perspective  
Although rational choice theory has a considerable academic pedigree in its mother field of 
economics, it is a relative newcomer to criminology.  Admittedly, several rational choice 
theories do exist in criminology (Clarke and Cornish, 1985, Cornish and Clarke, 1986) but it 
is the ‘perspective’ advocated by Clarke and Cornish (2000), which is discussed in this paper.  
Central to their perspective are a number of propositions (Clarke and Cornish, 2000). These 
include the assumption that crimes are deliberate and purposive: that is, those who commit 
crimes do so with the intention of deriving some type of benefit from such acts. Obvious 
examples are cash or material goods, but a broader reading of the term ‘benefits’ allows for 
the inclusion of other forms such as prestige, fun, excitement, sexual gratification, and 
domination. Joyriding is an example of how the benefits may take the intangible forms of fun 
and excitement.   
 
Another of the propositions relate to crime specificity.  The factors considered by criminals 
and the related variables that influence the decision-making process, vary considerably with 
the nature of the offence.  Thus an analysis of decision-making needs to be made with 
reference to specific categories of crime.  Legal categories of robbery and auto-theft are too 
generic, because these umbrella terms cover diversely motivated offences undertaken by a 
broad spectrum of offenders utilising a plethora of skills and methods.  For example, the theft 
of a car for temporary transport is different from the theft of a car for joyriding, which is again 
different to the theft of a car to be sold locally or overseas.  
 
Of further importance to the rational choice perspective is the proposition that criminal 
choices can be categorised into two groups, viz., ‘involvement’ and ‘event’ decisions.  The 
former relate to the three stages of the criminal or delinquent career.  The offender must make 
decisions about embarking on criminal activities, whether or not to continue these activities 
over a period of time, and when, if at all, to cease offending.  The latter refers to those 
decisions made during the commission of a crime, and in the case of suburban burglary, for 
example, could involve choices as to the target, the point of entry, and decisions about which 
items to steal. These choices are framed within the crime-specific focus. 
 The final proposition to be discussed centres on the sequence of event decisions, which an 
offender faces during the commission of a crime. Original work in this area focused solely on 
choices made in terms of potential target selection (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and 
Clarke 1986), but as a result of theoretical advancements it was realised that, as the criminal 
act unfolds, the perpetrator is required to make a series of decisions about other stages in the 
crime commission process (Clarke and Cornish, 2000). These stages include, for example, the 
preparation, target selection and the actual commission of the criminal act.  
 
 
Situational Crime Prevention  
SCP is a relatively new school of thought. Differing in its focus from most criminology, its 
starting point is an examination of those circumstances which afford specific kinds of crime.  
Through an understanding of these situations, measures are introduced to induce change in the 
relevant environments with the aim of reducing the opportunities for specific crimes.  Its 
emphasis is therefore on the criminal setting.  Rather than sanctioning or detecting offenders, 
the intention is to deter the occurrence of crime, and rather than seeking to reduce criminal 
tendencies through the enhancement of certain aspects of society, such as better housing or 
education, the relatively simple aim is to make criminal action less appealing to offenders 
(Clarke, 1997). 
 
Efforts to achieve this goal involve implementing opportunity reducing techniques, which 
target specific forms of crime and impact on the immediate criminal environment, in terms of 
its design, management or manipulation.  As can be seen in Table 1, associated with the 
techniques, are five major aims, which include increasing the effort or risks of crime, or 
reducing the potential rewards.  These are further complemented by removing the excuses of 
crime and negating provocative phenomena.  Examples of the techniques include target 
hardening (e.g. anti-robbery screens: to increase the effort), utilising place managers 
(multiple clerks in convenience stores: to increase the risks), target removal (e.g. removable 
car radios: to reduce the rewards), reducing frustrations and stress (e.g. efficient queues and 
polite service: to reduce provocations) and the setting of rules (e.g. harassment codes: to 
remove excuses), (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).   
 
In an attempt to block the commission of specific crimes, measures introduced into the 
immediate environment are designed to impact on the offender’s perceptions about the 
potential costs and benefits of crime commission.  In addition, it is assumed as part of the 
decision–making process that some evaluation is made with respect to the possible moral 
costs of offending. While some offenders may be prepared to shoplift, this does not mean they 
are prepared to mug the elderly.  In an attempt, however, to overcome any feelings of guilt or 
shame, offenders may try to neutralise such feeling through the construction of excuses such 
as ‘everybody else does it’, ‘I’m just borrowing it’, etc (Clarke, 1997).  SCP theorists have 
further acknowledged how the immediate environment may not only afford potential 
opportunities, but also provoke criminal behaviour.  Hence a number of techniques have been 
developed to assuage such phenomena (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). 
 
A final point to mention, and in keeping with the Rational Choice Perspective, is SCP’s crime 
specific focus. Forgoing, for example, a discussion of crime prevention at the level of 
‘burglary’ or ‘robbery’, greater emphasis is placed on those specific crimes that fall under 
these broader categories.  The argument advanced is that only a detailed understanding at the 
level of ‘specific crimes’ will afford insights for prevention programmes.  
Table 1: Twenty –five Techniques of Situational Prevention 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the Rewards Reduce Provocation Remove Excuses 
1. Target harden: 
• Steering column locks and 
immobilisers  
• Anti-robbery screens 
• Tamper-proof packaging 
6. Extend guardianship: 
• Take routine precautions: go out 
in group at night, leave signs of 
occupancy, carry phone 
• “Cocoon” neighbourhood watch 
 
11. Conceal targets: 
• Gender-neutral phone 
directories 
• Unmarked bullion 
trucks 
 
16.Reduce frustrations and 
stress: 
• Efficient queues and polite 
service 
• Expanded seating  
 
21.Set rules: 
• Rental agreements 
• Harassment codes 
• Hotel registration 
 
2. Control access to 
facilities: 
• Entry phones 
• Electronic card access 
• Baggage screening 
 
7. Assist natural surveillance: 
• Improved street lighting 
• Defensible space design  
• Support whistleblowers 
 
12. Remove targets: 
• Removable car radio 
• Women’s refuges 
• Pre-paid cards for pay 
phone 
 
17. Avoid disputes: 
• Separate enclosures for 
rival soccer fans 
• Reduce crowding in pubs 
• Fixed cab fares 
 
22.Post instructions: 
• “No Parking” 
• “Private Property” 
• “Extinguish camp 
fires” 
 
3. Screen exits: 
• Ticket needed for exit 
• Export documents 
• Electronic merchandise tags 
8. Reduce anonymity: 
• Taxi driver IDs 
• “How’s my driving?” decals 
• School uniforms 
 
13.Indentify property: 
• Property making  
• Vehicle licensing and 
parts marking 
• Cattle branding  
 
18.Reduce emotional 
arousal: 
• Controls on violent 
pornography 
• Enforce good behaviour on 
soccer field 
 
23.Alert conscience: 
• Roadside speed 
display boards 
• Signatures for customs 
declarations 
 
4. Deflect offenders: 
• Street closures 
• Separate bathrooms for 
women 
• Disperse pubs 
9. Utilize place managers: 
• CCTV for double-deck buses 
• Two clerks for convenience 
stores 
• Reward vigilance 
 
14.Discrupt markets: 
• Monitor pawn shops 
• Controls on classified 
ads 
• License street vendors 
 
19.Neutralise peer pressure: 
• “Idiots drink and drive” 
• “It’s ok to say No” 
• Disperse troublemakers at 
school 
 
24.Assist compliance: 
• Easy library checkout 
• Public lavatories 
• Litter bins 
 
5. Control tools/weapons: 
• “Smart” guns 
• Disabling stolen cell phones 
• Restrict spray paint sales to 
juveniles 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance: 
• Red light cameras 
• Burglar alarms 
• Security guards 
 
15.Deny benefits: 
• Ink merchandise tags 
• Graffiti cleaning  
• Speed humps 
 
20. Discourage imitation: 
• Rapid repair of vandalism 
• V-chips in TVs 
• Censor details of modus 
operandi 
 
25.Control drugs and 
alcohol:  
• Breathalysers in pubs 
• Servers intervention 
• Alcohol-free events 
 
 (Cornish and Clarke, 2003)
Hence, Poyner and Webb (1991) assert that preventive measures, needed for tackling 
burglary of domestic electronic goods, differ from those required to prevent the burglary 
of household cash or jewellery, owing to the differences in the way these crimes are 
committed. 
 
The Application of the Rational Choice Perspective to IS Security 
While underpinning the techniques advocated by SCP, at a broader level the rational 
choice perspective provides a framework for helping to explain all forms of crime.  The 
framework acts as a basis for modelling criminal decision making (Clarke and Cornish, 
2000).   
 
Involvement Decisions 
 As previously considered, involvement and event decisions form the two main groups 
encompassed by the rational choice framework. The former focuses on three stages of the 
criminal career, which include initiation, habituation and desistance. The extent to which 
modelling these three stages would provide prevention insights for the IS security field is 
problematic.  This is largely due to the fact that these stages are themselves influenced by 
‘background factors’, ‘current life circumstances’ and ‘situational variables’. Clouding 
the issue further is the role played by ‘background factors’.  Citing computer fraud as a 
case in point, Cornish and Clarke (1986) note how with certain forms of crime, the 
offender’s ‘background factors’ (which include upbringing, social class, ethnicity, 
educational opportunities etc.) appear to have little influence on involvement decisions.  
Hence, attempting to model the three stages of involvement decisions may prove difficult 
and ultimately fruitless. However, it is believed that greater inroads can be made into 
modelling the criminal behaviour associated with event decisions.    
  
Event Decisions 
These types of choices are made during the commission process and are framed within a 
crime specific focus. Early research into this area focussed on the choices made in terms 
of the criminal target, but, as a result of theoretical advancements, it was realised that the 
commission of a crime involves a sequence of event decisions. Clarke and Cornish 
(2000) note, for example, how: 
 
In the case of suburban burglary, the event may be sparked by some random 
occurrence, such as two burglars meeting up, both of whom need money … Plans 
begin to be made and a car or van may be stolen for transport.  The next step involves 
travelling to the neighbourhood selected and identifying a house to enter.  Ideally, this 
holds the promise of good pickings without the chance of being disturbed by the 
owners. A point of entry that it not too difficult or risky must then be found.  Getting 
into the house and rapidly choosing the goods to steal follow this stage.  The goods 
must then be carried to the car without being seen by neighbours or passers-by.  
Afterwards, they may have to be stashed safely while a purchaser is found.  Finally, 
they must be conveyed to the buyer and exchanged for cash. 
 (Clarke and Cornish, 2000, p. 31). 
 
As the burglary example illustrates, other decisions are made at the various stages of the 
whole commission process. If the stages and the associated decisions can be identified, 
the preventive scope for many diverse contexts could feasibly be extended.  Safeguards 
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could be implemented which impact on the potential offender’s choices and criminal acts, 
therefore, deterred. 
 
In an attempt to correctly identify the stages in the commission process, Cornish (1994a, 
1994b) advances the concept of crime scripts. The origins of this concept can be found in 
the field of cognitive science, which has addressed the production and understanding of 
sequences of events and actions (Gardner, 1985). More specifically scripts: 
 
 … constitute one of a family of hypothesised knowledge structures, or schemata, long 
considered by cognitive psychologists and cognitive social psychologists to organise 
our knowledge of people and events in ways which guide our understanding of other’s 
behaviour, and our own actions.  The script is generally viewed as being a special type 
of schema, known as an ‘event’ schema, since it organizes our knowledge about how 
to understand and enact commonplace behavioural processes or routines. 
(Cornish, 1994a, p. 32).   
 
The concept derives its name from the recognition of how knowledge about processes 
and routines takes a specific form, similar to a theatrical script (Schank and Abelson, 
1977). An example of such a process is the ‘restaurant script’, which organises an 
individual’s knowledge about what to do in such a context. The sections of the script 
include entering the establishment, finding a table, ordering, eating, paying the bill and 
leaving.  As the example illustrates, scripts comprise event sequences extended over time.  
The events in the sequence are interrelated given that events at the early stages of a script 
afford the occurrence of later ones. For example, in the restaurant script a customer 
cannot order until they have found a table.   
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 Hence the scripts concept focuses on behavioural processes involved in rational goal-
oriented actions. Moreover, the concept affords ‘concrete explanations about specific 
actions in specific domains’ (Hewstone, 1989: 103). Given this, Cornish argues that the 
script concept can act as a useful tool for analysing the ‘event’ stages in the commission 
of a specific crime i.e. scripts can be used to address the procedural stages of an offence.  
As he notes: 
 
A script-theoretic approach offers a way of generating, organising and systematising 
knowledge about the procedural aspects and procedural requirements of crime 
commission.  It has the potential to provide more appropriately crime-specific 
accounts of crime commission, and to extend this analysis to all the stages of the 
crime-commission sequence. 
 (Cornish, 1994b, p. 160) 
 
Two sources of information can be used to generate crime scripts.  They include offender 
accounts and secondary sources of data such as published research, security surveys, 
newspaper accounts etc. While there are obvious practical problems associated with 
obtaining offender accounts, preliminary efforts could be initiated by the construction of 
‘draft’ scripts through the use of secondary sources.  To aid in their development, Cornish 
(1994a, 1994b) argues that the universal script can act as a useful guiding framework.  
Common to all scripts are a set of generalised scenes, which form the basis of the 
universal script.  The separate elements of this type of script are sequential in order and 
together they provide a framework that could be used by researchers or practitioners for 
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modelling the commission of a specific crime.  In essence, each ‘scene/function’ stage of 
the universal script can be viewed as a procedural stage of a crime. 
 
One advantage of the universal script is that modelling can proceed, regardless of the 
levels of existing information about the offence in question. Table 2 provides the example 
of a ‘subway mugging’ universal script. Under the ‘scene/function’ heading are listed the 
procedural stages of the universal script. The second column cites the corresponding 
criminal behaviour for each stage. Once the crime scripts have been generated, clearer 
insights are provided into the procedural stages of the particular offence.  The practitioner 
is then given the ability to systematically implement the appropriate controls once 
granted a greater understanding of a particular crime.  
 
Table 2 Subway Mugging Script  
 
SCENE / FUNCTION SCRIPT FUNCTION 
PREPARATION Meet and agree on hunting ground 
ENTRY Entry into underground system 
PRE-CONDITION Travel to hunting ground 
PRE-CONDITION Waiting/circulating at hunting ground 
INSTRUMENTAL PRE-CONDITION Selecting victim and circumstance 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 INITIATION 
Closing–in/preparation 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 ACTUALIZATION 
Striking at victim 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 ACTUALIZATION 
Pressing home attack 
DOING Take money, jewelry, etc. 
POST-CONDITION Escape from scene 
EXIT Exit from system 
(Cornish, 1994b) 
 
An example of a computer crime script is illustrated in Table 3. Based on details cited in 
the 1998 UK Audit Report (Audit Commission, 1998) the crime in question involved a 
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local council employee who committed computer fraud.  Taking advantage of poor access 
security (colleagues failed to lock their computers when leaving the office for a 
substantial period of time), the employee would wait until other members of staff had 
vacated the office.  He would then access their computers to process the fraud.  In total 
£15,000 was embezzled, through the setting-up, inputting and authorisation of fictitious 
invoices.  
 
Table 3 Computer Fraud Script 
SCENCE FUNCTION SCRIPT ACTION SITUATIONAL 
CONTROL 
Preparation Deliberately gaining 
access to the organisation 
Prospective employee 
screening 
Entry Already authorised as 
employee 
------ 
Pre-condition Wait for employees 
absence from offices. 
Physical segregation of 
duties. 
Staggered breaks 
Signing In/Out of offices 
Instrumental  
Pre-Condition 
Access colleagues’ 
computers 
System time outs 
Biometric fingerprint 
authentication 
Instrumental 
Initiation 
Access programmes 
 
Password use for access to 
specific programmes 
Instrumental 
Actualization 
False customer account 
construction 
Two person sign-off on 
creation of new accounts 
Doing Authorisation of fictitious 
invoices 
Audit of computer logs 
Budget monitoring 
 
Post Condition Exit programmes ------ 
Exit Exit system User event viewer 
Doing Later Spend the transferred 
money 
------ 
 
 
As noted, with each corresponding script action there is the aim of implementing 
corresponding controls.  However, unlike the more traditional crimes addressed by SCP 
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and the Rational Choice Perspective, employee computer abuse which is perpetrated in 
the organisational context can be termed ‘specialized access crimes’ (Felson, 2002).  In 
other words, only those people who have access to the environment are in a position to 
commit the crime.  It is, therefore, difficult to implement ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ controls, for 
staff who have access to the criminal context as a result of their employment.  But, as 
noted earlier, the elements of a script are interrelated and the scripts actions in a prior 
stage afford the existence in a later one. In Table 3, therefore, the ‘entry’ into the 
organisation is achieved by ‘deliberately gaining access to the organisation’.  Hence, 
specialized access crimes can involve either i) long range planning, whereby an 
individual deliberately applies for a job with the intention of committing an offence, or  
ii) where an individual applies for a job without criminal intent, but later on, for whatever 
reason (e.g. becomes disgruntled, develops an addiction, marriage breakdown etc.), 
decides to perpetrate a crime.  Table 3 presupposes the former.  Therefore, an appropriate 
control at the ‘Preparation’ stage would be the screening of prospective employees.   
 
While the discussion of the ‘entry’ into environments, which enable specialised access 
crimes, may appear pedantic, it is precisely this attention to detail which helps to produce 
effective scripts.   
 
Using the universal framework as a guide to script creation invites consideration of all the 
procedural aspects of the offence ensuring that no aspect of the commission process is 
overlooked.  In addition the universal script affords examination of the process from the 
offender’s viewpoint and actions.  In this way, common-sense ‘knowledge’ about crime 
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commission can potentially be debunked and a more rigorous understanding of the 
commission process can be afforded to those addressing IS security.  Ignoring the 
realities of such behaviour, may result in failing to apply appropriate safeguards or 
applying safeguards which are inappropriate.  Corresponding controls, therefore, can only 
be implemented if the actions which warrant their application are correctly identified. 
 
While examining offender behaviour, scripts also draw attention to the required attributes 
for perpetration.  As noted, Parker (1976, 1981, 1998) and Wood (2002) have stressed the 
need to consider the offender in terms of certain attributes such as skills, knowledge, 
access and resources.  The scripts method can enhance this analysis owing to its focus on 
the offender/context relationship.  Hence, offender attributes are more clearly identified 
as specific contexts plays a large role in defining and delimiting them.  So, for example, 
in the local council fraud, the rogue employee presumably required accounting skills and 
knowledge of the particular invoicing system.    By systematically working through the 
script stages practitioners could feasibly acquire greater insights into attributes required 
by the offender.  This would hopefully enhance prevention programmes by looking at 
ways of denying access to such attributes.   
 
 
The Application of SCP to IS Security 
The twenty five techniques advocated by SCP could be adopted by practitioners to 
complement script analysis.  Indeed, to some extent, these techniques are already 
implicitly used by organisations to enhance their IS security.  Examples include property 
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identification (for computer equipment), removing targets (clear-desk policies), target 
hardening (a-drive locks), and access controls (for computing resources and 
organisational physical security).  As shown, existing IS security controls can easily be 
categorised according to the SCP techniques. 
 
While the existing SCP techniques are already partially employed in the IS domain,  
using the SCP techniques as a guide potentially enables the practitioner to systematically, 
and explicitly, consider all the alternative safeguard options for influencing the offender’s 
decision making processes.  Hence, the practitioner can consider each of the five 
techniques for increasing the effort, increasing the risk, reducing the rewards, reducing 
provocations and removing excuses.  Using the SCP techniques in conjunction with the 
script analysis may therefore enable the practitioner to optimise safeguard selection in the 
following manner.  First, the scripts analysis can help in identifying all the stages in the 
commission process, and secondly, the SCP techniques allow for consideration of 
alternative safeguards per each stage. 
 
In addition, the SCP techniques encompass areas of prevention which are relatively 
unexplored by IS security practitioners and whose exploitation may prove fruitful.  For 
example, one of these areas encompasses the SCP techniques entitled ‘removing 
excuses’.  An earlier categorisation of the techniques focussed on attempts to increase the 
risks and efforts and reduced the rewards of crime (Clarke, 1992). Here, the measures 
tended to rely on the physical manipulation of the criminal environment in an attempt to 
reduce the opportunities for crime.  More recently, however, the rational choice 
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perspective has developed to encompass recognition of how some offenders assess their 
own morality, and are often able to absolve themselves of the guilt and shame associated 
with criminal acts.  Such absolution is achieved by individuals rationalising their actions 
in a manner which helps neutralise these negative emotions. Common examples of these 
rationalisations include ‘I was just borrowing it’ and ‘everybody else does it’. Support for 
this assertion comes from earlier criminological and psychological research (Sykes and 
Matza, 1957; Bandura, 1976, 1977).  Focusing on the area of juvenile delinquency, Sykes 
and Matza, (1957) identify five ‘techniques of neutralisation’. Similarly, Bandura (1976, 
1977) in attempting to explain the maintenance of aggressive behaviour, discusses how 
‘self-reinforcing’ influences which help to regulate an individual’s conduct, can be 
divorced from aggressive actions. He argues that this is achieved through ‘cognitive 
disengagement’, and identifies ten forms. Hence, a group of measures aimed at ‘removing 
excuses’ (i.e. the rationalisations) has been advocated (Clarke and Homel, 1997; Clarke, 
1997).  If offenders can be stopped from rationalising and excusing their criminal actions 
in specific settings, then they will be open to feelings of guilt and shame.   
 
As noted earlier, there has been some consideration of these rationalisation in the IS 
security field (Harrington, 1996, Sherizen, 1995), but a more systematic consideration 
and exploitation of these techniques may complement existing prevention practices.  For 
example, Cornish and Clarke (2003) advance five types of ‘removing excuses’ 
techniques, but similar work in this area has been undertaken by Worltey (1996) who 
identifies four broad strategies through which IS security methods could possibly be 
enhanced.  These areas include ‘rule setting’, ‘clarifying responsibility’, ‘clarifying 
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consequences’ and ‘increasing victim worth’.  So, for example, with regard to ‘increasing 
victim worth’, such a strategy recognises how offenders find it easier to perpetrate crimes 
if they perceive their victims to be ‘unworthy’, ‘sub-human’, ‘outsiders’, ‘anonymous’, or 
‘deserving of the fate’. The prevention strategy entails attempts to reduce 
depersonalization and develop an emotional bond between potential offenders and 
victims.  Wortley notes how it is not just individuals but also organisations which are 
open to this form of offender derogation.  Discussing the example of organisational fraud, 
he argues: 
 
Employee share schemes, incentive schemes and general attention to reducing job 
dissatisfaction may increase in employees a sense of attachment to a company and 
inhibit their ability to portray the company in ways that justify acting fraudulently 
against it (Wortley, 1996, pp. 122-123).  
 
 
Conclusion  
IS security represents a growing concern for organisations.  While external threats require 
due consideration, the threat posed by rogue employees should not be ignored.  From an 
academic perspective a modest but growing number of texts have addressed the insider 
threat.  However, to date, there has been a lack of attention given to the interactive 
relationship between offender choices made during the actual perpetration of computer 
crimes, and the context in which such crimes take place.  To address this deficiency the 
rational choice perspective and situational crime prevention are advanced in this paper, 
for addressing the procedural stages of crime.  Central to the rational choice perspective 
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is an examination of criminal decisions.  Event decisions encompass those choices made 
by the offender during the crime commission process.  By using the scripts method, the 
various related stages of this process could feasibly be identified.  In this way, the goal 
would be to identify the offender behaviour per each stage and implement controls 
accordingly.  Hence the IS security strategy would aim to disrupt the criminal act through 
the implementation of safeguards which influence the offender’s choices and prevent 
successful perpetration. 
 
The SCP techniques, based on the conceptualisation of the offender as advocated by the 
rational choice perspective, could feasibly be used to complement the scripts method.  
While some of the techniques are already employed in the IS domain, consideration of 
the complete range advanced by SCP potentially enables the practitioner to 
systematically, and explicitly, consider all the alternative safeguard options for 
influencing the offender’s decision making processes.   
 
Currently organisations can draw on a number of means for guidance on safeguard 
selection.  These include the use of risk assessment techniques (Peltier, 2004), 
international standards, such as ISO BS17799 (ISO BS17799, 2000), or the ‘baseline 
security’ approach (Parker, 1998), where controls are selected based on best practice 
principles.  Irrespective of whether an organisation uses one or more of these means, by 
RCP and SCP can both complement existing security practices.  The scripts approach can 
help in understanding the offender/context relationship.  Through a greater understanding 
of the offender choices and the associated behaviour, consideration can then be given to 
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appropriate safeguards.  As noted, the opportunity reducing techniques advanced by SCP 
can potentially act as a guide for practitioners by enabling them to systematically 
consider all the safeguard options for influencing the offender’s decision making process.   
 
Future research could encompass the development of crime scripts through the use of the 
action research method (Mathiassen, 2002; Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1998).  More 
precisely research could involve the use of the universal script as the basis for such 
development.  In this sense, the action research method would be used to evaluate the 
feasibility of developing script in the organisational context.  .       
 
As noted the SCP techniques cover aspects of prevention which are relatively unexplored 
by IS security researchers.  The category of SCP techniques entitled ‘removing excuses’ 
is a case in point.  Underpinned by rationalization theories advanced by Sykes and Matza 
(1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977), these SCP techniques represent potentially fruitful 
areas for future research.   
 
Applying criminological theories to the IS context, has the potential for providing new 
perspectives and insights, for enhancing security strategies.  While progress has been 
made in recognising and enhancing how employees are central to the security of an 
organisation (Siponen, 2005), focus should also be placed on how some staff overcome 
such security through criminal behaviour.  To date the application of criminological 
theory to the IS security field has been minimal, but where better to find insight into 
crime and criminals than from a body of knowledge which examines precisely that.   
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